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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new Blockchain-based mes-
sage and revocation accountability system called Blackchain.
Combining a distributed ledger with existing mechanisms
for security in V2X communication systems, we design a dis-
tributed event data recorder (EDR) that satisfies traditional
accountability requirements by providing a compressed global
state. Unlike previous approaches, our distributed ledger so-
lution provides an accountable revocation mechanism with-
out requiring trust in a single misbehavior authority, instead
allowing a collaborative and transparent decision making
process through Blackchain. This makes Blackchain an at-
tractive alternative to existing solutions for revocation in a
Security Credential Management System (SCMS), which suf-
fer from the traditional disadvantages of PKIs, notably includ-
ing centralized trust. Our proposal becomes scalable through
the use of hierarchical consensus: individual vehicles dynam-
ically create clusters, which then provide their consensus
decisions as input for road-side units (RSUs), which in turn
publish their results to misbehavior authorities. This author-
ity, which is traditionally a single entity in the SCMS, re-
sponsible for the integrity of the entire V2X network, is now
a set of authorities that transparently perform a revocation,
whose result is then published in a global Blackchain state.
This state can be used to prevent the issuance of certificates
to previously malicious users, and also prevents the author-
ity from misbehaving through the transparency implied by
a global system state.
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1 Introduction
An event data recorder (EDR), the car equivalent of a flight
recorder, can be used for a multitude of applications, e.g.,
forensic accident reconstruction [4, 10] and misbehavior
detection [12]. Although EDRs are easy to implement for
in-vehicle communication, where the amount of events is
limited, the required append-only and write-once seman-
tics (i.e., it should not be possible to change logs) makes it
non-trivial to implement for vehicle-to-vehicle communica-
tion. The most notable disadvantage is that more expensive
tamper-resistant hardware is required to either store the
EDR log directly, or implement and protect cryptographic
means to protect a log stored in a file, an issue caused mainly
by the much higher message volume in V2X communication.
In addition, de-duplication of the different EDR logs across
vehicles is not possible, i.e., when reporting misbehavior,
the complete logs of all vehicles (at the very least for the
corresponding time frame where misbehavior occurred) are
required.
To tackle these problems, this paper examines the use
of distributed ledgers (DL) for this application. Distributed
ledgers are distributed data storages, which provide an append-
only semantic to the participants. The most well known im-
plementation of a distributed ledger, Bitcoin [8], provides
the consensus, and therefore tamper-proofing, by restricting
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the rate of data write through a proof-of-work mechanism.
However, a naive adoption of this ledger is not suitable for
our scenario, because it does not scale to the message fre-
quency encountered by an in-vehicle EDR. Multiple works
on scaling the transaction throughput with the help of off-
chain state channels [9] or sharding [6] help to improve the
performance in the current setting, but are not optimised for
our setting, coping with delays and significant churn.
Therefore we propose a permissioned Blockchain, with
which we can build a hierarchical byzantine fault tolerant
consensus. On the lowest layer, cars form clusters and agree
on a state change which is propagated to a road side unit
(RSU). As there are too many RSUs deployed to reach a global
consensus efficiently, smaller RSU groups form and aggregate
a partial state. The fixed set of transaction issuers allow for a
weighted consensus and efficient, distributed mining process.
In recent years, with concrete implementation plans for
V2X communication systems, researchers have started to
look more closely at the design of a real-world public key
infrastructure (PKI) and the multitude of requirements in
such a system. Most recent designs, such as that proposed by
Whyte et al. [13], include amisbehavior authority, in addition
to a standard certificate revocation component as in regular
PKIs. This authority is responsible for accepting misbehavior
reports, processing them according to some fixed algorithm,
and revoking any vehicles that show malicious behavior. In
the real world, it is likely that not just one, but several of
such SCMSs will be deployed by competing entities (either
vehicle manufacturers or countries [10]).
To make the revocation process more transparent, and to
reduce the trust necessary in any one SCMS, we propose the
use of a distributed ledger for accountability. This system
will use the transactions received from the RSUs, backed by
the permissioned Blockchain described above, and publish
them in a public, permissionless Blockchain, for public verifi-
ability. This provides accountability between MAs, as well as
towards the users of the system (i.e., the vehicle owners), due
to the publicly verifiable nature of this chain. This process
aims to provide global revocation of misbehaving vehicles;
existing proposals all require centralized trust for this pro-
cess. Although there is a lot of work on how to locally revoke
malicious vehicles [1, 5], global revocation without central
authorities is a challenge that has received limited attention
so far.
In the remainder of this paper, we introduce the concep-
tual foundations of our proposal. Specifically, we describe a
detailed system model, including privacy and attacker mod-
els, in Section 2. Section 3 then describes our Blackchain
proposal and some possible attacks on our base system. We
finally discuss the implications of these ideas for distributed
ledgers and misbehavior detection research in Section 4.
2 System and Attacker Model
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) consist of vehicles and
road-side units (RSUs), equipped with wireless communica-
tion modules. Unlike traditional wireless networks, VANETs
are primarily based on broadcast communication: vehicles pe-
riodically broadcast beacons, containing application-relevant
information such as position, speed, heading, and somemeta-
data. Applications of VANETs vary from crash avoidance to
finding fastest routes and fuel and road efficiency applica-
tions, which can potentially be combined with self-driving
vehicles to further increase performance.
Communication typically uses the IEEE 802.11 standard,
with a range between 300 and 1000 meters; many authors
propose more advanced communication patterns on top of
this. RSUs are typically assumed to be available in some
locations only (e.g., attached to traffic lights), but provide
an intermittent link to the Internet for all vehicles. Some
research suggests that the current work in 5G cellular com-
munication may provide more permanent Internet connec-
tivity, although this may be costly for users; a heterogeneous
network using both technologies is a current hot topic in
this community [11]. For this paper, we focus on the case
of clustering, where vehicles communicate with others in
communication range directly, but a cluster head (CH) is
responsible for communication with other clusters. For an
overview of clustering techniques, we refer interested read-
ers to a recent survey by Cooper et al. [3].
In VANETs, security plays an important role, due to the
lives dependent on the communication. Unlike existing IT
infrastructures, the main focus of security lies on integrity
and availability, rather than confidentiality; it is generally
assumed that the message contents are not encrypted, since
any vehicle needs access to this content for any VANET ap-
plication to provide any real benefit. Message integrity is
generally protected through signed messages, where each
vehicle possesses a number of authentic public keys from
a vehicular public key infrastructure (VPKI). This PKI has
one additional requirement: each vehicle should receive mul-
tiple certificates, in order to protect user privacy; this is
important, because each broadcast message contains a signa-
ture signed with a public key, and the corresponding certifi-
cate is attached to the message. The certificates are referred
to as pseudonyms, which contain a cryptographically pro-
tected link to the users’ long-term certificate. To prevent
attackers from using all certificates at the same time, these
pseudonyms have limited validity periods that only over-
lap partially; in addition, there is a revocation protocol that
reveals the cryptographic link if misbehavior is detected.
One of the proposed standards to organize such a VPKI,
proposed by Whyte et al. [13], is the security credential man-
agement system (SCMS), which proposes a number of author-
ities to protect the privacy of the users. Issuing pseudonyms
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involves the following authorities: the enrollment certifi-
cate authority (ECA), responsible for long-term identities
of vehicles, the registration authority (RA), who essentially
checks whether a vehicle may still receive pseudonyms, and
the pseudonym certificate authority (PCA), which issues
pseudonyms. When vehicles or cluster heads report misbe-
havior, this report mainly concerns specific vehicles and in-
cludes evidence (see e.g. [2]). This evidence consists of signed
messages, and potentially misbehavior detection results that
can be verified by re-executing the detection process (i.e.,
they are publicly verifiable); a sample misbehavior report
can be found in Figure 1. In this example, the trust statement
mirrors the result of the local misbehavior detection system;
apart from identifiers of the suspected vehicles, the report
stores the detected misbehavior, the pseudonym identifier
of the reporter and the associated cluster identifier. This
information is processed by a misbehavior authority (MA),
which can decide on the validity of these reports and sub-
sequently revoke pseudonyms and long term identities in
cooperation with the PCA and one or more linkage authority
(LA). This protocol also informs the RA not to issue any more
certificates for the reported vehicle.
It is important that the MA only revokes based on reli-
able reports, which requires that the MA is able to validate
the reports of vehicles (i.e., objectively check the evidence)
and detect when an attack against the revocation system
itself is on-going. Attacks on the revocation system include
those that exist for traditional reputation systems (e.g., bad-
mouthing attacks, where an attacker creates false accusa-
tions), often combined with Sybil attacks (where an attacker
uses multiple pseudonyms to artificially increase the evi-
dence for their claim). In our proposed system model, we
allow the attacker to use at most two pseudonyms at any
time, in order to limit the Sybil attack capabilities within a
cluster. This can be achieved in real-world system by limiting
the validity of certificates appropriately (as discussed in EU
proposals [7]), increasing the overhead, but providing tighter
control with limited privacy loss.
3 Blackchain
We propose Blackchain (Blackbox Blockchain), with which
we aim to provide cluster-based VANETs with an integrated
accountability system that exploits clusters to create a dis-
tributed ledger for exchanged messages. Since these mes-
sages relate to real-world observations and processes, there
are objective ways to establish which of these messages are
correct (i.e., corresponding to the real world), and which
contain false data. Detecting malicious actors this way is
referred to as misbehavior detection: for a survey of different
mechanisms that can be used for this purpose, we refer in-
terested readers to our recent survey on this topic [12]. This
objective truth is publicly verifiable, i.e., it can also be used
to detect attackers at a central location, such as the MA dis-
cussed in the previous section. In this paper, we propose that
the Blackchain can be used to perform this centralized mis-
behavior detection and revocation without requiring trust
in any individual trusted third party (TTP). The concept is
shown in Figure 2: different countries will likely run their
own SCMS, and a protocol is needed to perform cross-border
revocation. Our proposal not only enables this functionality,
but also makes each SCMS accountable towards the par-
ticipating vehicles, because Blackchain’s publicly verifiable
permissionless Blockchain can be accessed (and potentially
mined) by anyone.
Each vehicle accumulates information about it’s own state
and, through received messages, about other vehicles in the
vicinity. Unlike the classical approach to store these state
changes in an EDR, with the overhead of a trusted platform
to ensure the append-only property, we persist these changes
in a DL. A direct approach to this would be to require each
vehicle to participate in the Blackchain directly as a network
node. Having observations from different nearby neighbours
in the Blackchain, malicious behaviour can easily be detected
through misbehavior detection. By propagating the resulting
blocks to theMAs, who also participate in the Blackchain net-
work, a consensus decision can then be made to revoke the
corresponding vehicle, which can be stored in the Blackchain
along with the associated evidence, persisting all the rele-
vant information automatically. This would result in a public,
permissionless Blockchain, where all vehicles and MAs mine
blocks by reaching consensus about misbehavior detection
decisions.
However, this approach is not viable in the presence of mil-
lions of vehicles, the lack of permanent internet connectivity,
and high message frequencies (10 Hz per vehicle). There-
fore, we reduce the amount of state updates, and remove
the requirement that vehicles mine into the permissionless
blockchain, by replacing it with a localized, permissioned
chain. To reduce the amount of state updates, we require
vehicles to participate in clustered communication to agree
on a common state, and to decide on potential revocation de-
cisions (using a local revocation protocol, such as OREN [1]).
The cluster state reduces the size and frequency of updates
from vehicles, but still allows other parties to verify the cor-
rect behaviour of the cluster participants. These clusters
are implemented using a permissioned Blockchain (i.e., only
non-revoked vehicles and RSUs may participate), and their
decisions are forwarded to the MAs. Hierarchical clusters
can be used to further reduce the size of these consensus
groups, if necessary for performance reasons.
The advantage of using hierarchical clusters is that these
will consist of RSUs, all of which have known identities
(because such devices will not have privacy requirements
anyway); thus, these can be used to run a byzantine fault
tolerance (BFT) consensus. This is not so easy within a clus-
ter of vehicles and RSUs, because vehicles can potentially
SERIAL’17, December 11–15, 2017, Las Vegas, NV, USA R. W. vd Heijden, F. Engelmann, D. Mödinger, F. Schönig, F. Kargl
ID1 Trust Statement1 EvidenceMisbehavior type
 Pseudonym identifierof reporter
Signature
Cluster identifier
 
Report information Suspect nodes
ID2 Trust Statement2 Evidence...   
... ... 
Figure 1. Sample structure of a misbehaviour Report
RSU RSU
MA
RA
ECA
PCA
LA2
LA1
req
valid?
req encrypted
pseudonyms
encrypted
pseudonyms
Vehicle
revocation
protocol
SCMS in nation A
MA
RA
ECA
PCA
LA2
LA1
req
valid?
reqencryptedpseudonyms
encrypted
pseudonyms
Vehicle
revocation
protocol
SCMS in nation B
report
reportCluster
Vehicle Vehicle...
RSU
report
validation
protocol
broadcast
Figure 2. Blackchain’s underlying system architecture.
change their identity once per time slot (due to the partially
overlapping validity periods discussed in the previous sec-
tion). However, if all RSUs around the world are used in BFT
consensus, this will still result in poor performance, due to
latency and the sheer number of RSUs that some propos-
als suggest (some even recommend full road coverage). To
resolve this issue, we propose that BFT consensus may be
reached in smaller groups of RSUs; unlike within vehicle
clusters, latency requirements are not as significant an issue.
Clustering can be done by different parameters, depending
on how widely RSUs are deployed, e.g., all RSUs in one city
or all RSUs in a specific grid area. These RSUs then report
the resulting consensus and corresponding evidence to the
MAs, which use these decisions as input for the public, per-
missionless Blockchain. Since the consensus relies on the
evidence provided by vehicles, the reports received by an
MA can still be publicly verified; thus the public nature of the
Blackchain allows all participants to verify the correctness of
these decisions. The transaction format on the public chain
therefore contains the report with evidence for internal con-
sistence, a signature, e.g., of the RSU group, and a list of
references, identifying the participants with there identities
in the public chain. This structure allows for a full audit up to
the introduction of the participants, which signed the report,
in the public chain. This introduction is again a consensus
of the participants of the public chain.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided some conceptual foundations
for Blackchain, a distributed ledger that provides account-
ability for misbehavior authorities and vehicles alike. The
purpose of Blackchain is to reduce the trust requirements on
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users of a vehicular communication system, improving the
performance of global revocation algorithms by employing
hierarchical consensus, and creating accountability for mis-
behavior authorities. However, these foundations are only
the first step in this area of research: there are many open
questions that still need to be solved to make this system
practically feasible. From the vehicular perspective, the most
important factor is whether clusters are stable enough to pro-
vide the necessary consensus algorithms. From a distributed
ledger perspective, the most exciting question is what guar-
antees hierarchical consensus can provide compared to a full
consensus where all RSUs and MAs (and even potentially all
vehicles) participate. Although Blackchain itself may not be
feasible to implement, we think our proposal gives interest-
ing directions of research for both fields, which are valuable
beyond the actual implementation of Blackchain.
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